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Perspectives on Development1
“Even when these nations try to break free from their colonial heritage, that is, 
their dependence on the export of primary products, through the implementa-
tion of development plans directed at diversifying their economies, they gener-
ally need foreign currency to achieve this. But they can only access foreign cur-
rency by exporting primary products, which again increases their dependence on 
exports. Paradoxically, by trying to exploit their comparative advantages, these 
countries that are exporters of natural assets, are frequently reassuming their co-
lonial role as exporters of primary products- a role now redeﬁned in terms of the 
neoliberal rationality of globalising capitalism. For them, neo-colonialism is the 
next step on from post-colonialism.” (Coronil 2002)
1. Transition into the ‘Commodities Consensus’ and the change
in the extractive economy
Over the last decade Latin America has switched from the Washington 
Consensus with its focus on ﬁnance to the Commodities Consensus based 
on the large-scale export of primary products. Although the exploitation 
and export of natural assets is by no means a new activity in the region, 
increasing growth was evident in this area towards the end of the 20th 
Century. Against the backdrop of a changing system of accumulation, the 
expansion of projects geared towards monitoring, extracting and exporting 
natural assets without (greater) added value intensiﬁed. 
What we are therefore referring to here as the ‘Commodities 
Consensus’ is the line drawn at the beginning of a new economic and polit-
ical order sustained by the boom in international prices for raw materials 
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and consumer goods, which are increasingly demanded by industrialised 
and emerging countries. /is new economic cycle is characterised by extra-
ordinary proﬁtability and the high growth rates of Latin American econo-
mies. According to CEPAL (2011a: 65), “in spite of recent trends to stabilise 
prices, increases during the ﬁrst half of the year were so great that a signi-
ﬁcant improvement in exchange terms in Latin America is expected.” /e 
majority of the region’s exported commodities grew exponentially during 
the last few months of 2010 and the beginning of 2011. Food prices reached 
an all time high in April 2011 (maize, soya and wheat). Prices for metals and 
minerals too were above the maximums registered before the crisis of 2008. 
CEPAL data projects a 4.7 growth in GDP for 2011 compared to the 6 
achieved in 2010 (see CEPAL 2011a; Bárcena 2011). /us, even within the 
context of an international economic and ﬁnancial crisis that heralds great 
uncertainty and volatility in the markets, Latin America will continue on 
a positive track.
Nonetheless, and in despite the promise of further economic growth, 
which cannot be valued highly enough after decades of economic austerity 
and structural adjustments, the current economic model displays numerous 
structural ﬁssures. On the one hand, compared to the 1980s, the demand 
for raw materials and consumer goods has led Latin American economies 
to rapidly become providers of primary products. An earlier report by 
CEPAL demonstrated this trend. /e ﬁgures for 2009 showed an increase 
compared to the year before. In the Andean Community the percentage 
of primary products exported went from 81 in 2008 to 82.3 in 2009. 
/is growth was even greater in the MERCOSUR, rising from 59.8 to 
63.1 (CEPAL 2010). As Gudynas (2009) showed, Bolivia leads this process 
of re-primarisation (92.9 of Bolivia’s exports are primary products), but 
this dynamic even aﬀects a country like Brazil. During Lula da Silva’s two 
successive presidencies, the share of primary products in exports rose from 
48.5 in 2003 to 60.9 in 2009. 
It is also worth mentioning that this process of re-primarisation is 
accompanied by a loss of food sovereignty, which seems to be linked as 
much to the large-scale export of food as to the end purpose of this food. 
/e growing demand for these products is increasingly geared towards live-
stock feed or bio fuel production. /is is because other energy sources are 
becoming more expensive and also because of the adverse climatic condi-
tions in other countries.
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On the other hand, in terms of the logic of accumulation, the new 
Commodities Consensus delves into the dynamic of dispossession of land, 
resources and territories whilst simultaneously creating new forms of depen-
dency and domination. It is no coincidence that a large part of critical Latin 
American authors believe the result of these processes will be the consolida-
tion of a model of development based on an extractive economy. Inherent 
to such an economy is a type of accumulation based on an over-exploitation 
of – largely non-renewable – natural resources as well as the expansion of 
frontiers to territories formerly considered ‘unproductive’. /is deﬁnition of 
an economy based on extraction is not limited to activities normally falling 
into this category (mining and oil), but also includes other sectors such as 
agribusiness or the production of bio fuels. /is is due to the fact that they 
consolidate a model that tends to follow a monoculture, the destruction of 
biodiversity, a concentration of landownership and a destructive re-conﬁ-
guration of vast territories.
In addition, it includes the transport infrastructure projects (water-
ways, harbours, bi-oceanic corridors, and so on), energy projects (large 
hydro dams) and communication infrastructure projects planned by 
IIRSA, the Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of 
South America (Iniciativa para la Integración de la Infraestrucutra Regional 
Suramericana), a programme various South American governments agreed 
upon in the year 2000 with the central goal of facilitating the extraction 
and export of products to their destination points.
Another of the current extractive economic model’s traits – consoli-
dated under the Commodities Consensus – is the large scale of the projects. 
/is alone says a lot about the magnitude of capital investments (in fact 
these projects are more capital- than labour-intensive), the types of players 
involved (large transnational corporations) and the major impact and risks 
these projects pose for social, economic and environmental issues in the 
territories where they are executed.
On the other hand these projects usually lead to the consolidation 
of export enclaves with little or no connection to local chains of produc-
tion. /ey create strong social and regional fragmentations and conﬁgure 
socio-productive spheres dependent on the international market and the 
volatility of the prices on this market (Gudynas 2009; Colectivo Voces de 
Alerta 2011). Lastly, the large scale of such projects not only challenges the 
existing economic and social structures; it also curtails democracy in the 
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sense that the population has no say in the development of projects. /is 
generates all kinds of social conﬂict, divisions in society and a spiral of 
criminalisation of resistance which will undoubtedly open the door to a 
new and dangerous chapter of human rights violations.
Furthermore, the advantage of appealing to a ‘consensus’ is that it does 
not just invoke an economic order. It also consolidates a system of domi-
nation diﬀerent to that which existed in the 1990s because it refers less to 
the emergence of a single dominant discourse that downplays the role of 
ideologies or celebrates neoliberalism as the unrivalled goal of our times; 
rather, it points more to a series of ambivalences and paradoxes that mark 
the coexistence and interweaving of neoliberal ideology and new progres-
sive development.
/e Commodities Consensus can therefore be understood in terms of 
a series of ruptures as much as that of continuities from the prior period. As 
already occurred during the Washington Consensus phase, the Commo-
dities Consensus also establishes rules that imply the acceptance of new 
asymmetric environmental and political relations and inequalities by Latin 
American countries in the new geopolitical order. It helps to stress the links 
between one period and the next, because the transformations suﬀered by 
the state and the policy of privatising public goods during the 1990s eﬀec-
tively established the normative and legal basis for the extractive economy. 
/ey guarantee ‘legal security’ for the invested capital and high proﬁta-
bility for companies that in general terms will persist – notwithstanding 
speciﬁc variations – in the commodities era.
Nevertheless, there are signiﬁcant elements of diﬀerentiation and 
rupture. We must not forget that in the 1990s, the Washington Consensus 
put ﬁnance at the top of the agenda, bringing with it a policy of important 
structural adjustments and privatisations that ended up redeﬁning the state 
as simply a mediating, regulatory agent. /e system also brought about a 
homogenisation of politics in the region, characterised by the identiﬁcation 
with or great proximity to neoliberal models. At present, the Commodities 
Consensus focuses on the implementation of large-scale, export-oriented 
extractive projects by establishing the role of the state and its relation to 
society in various ways. /is enables the establishment and co-existence of 
progressive governments that question the neoliberal consensus and other 
governments that continue to delve into a conservative political agenda 
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within the neoliberal framework. Whereas the former show evidence of 
a change in political language and ways of intervening in society, while 
following heterodox economic policies (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, 
Argentina, Brazil and others), the countries in the latter group continue 
along an orthodox economic route (Mexico, Colombia, Peru).
Consequently, from a political perspective, the Commodities 
Consensus is a sphere of changing power constellations that allows for a 
kind of dialectical progress that combines the aforementioned continui-
ties and ruptures in a new ‘post-neoliberal’ context; however, this does not 
mean that it supersedes so-called neoliberalism. As a result, this context 
confronts us with a series of new theoretical and practical challenges. /ese 
encompass various spheres, which are at once economic, social, and ecolo-
gical while also political and civilisational.
2. Progressive governments and fractures in critical thinking 
One of the characteristic traits of the Commodities Consensus is that 
it is accompanied by an explosion of socio-environmental conﬂicts linked 
to the disputes over land and common goods. It is therefore no coinci-
dence that Latin America has experienced innumerable struggles spurred 
by socio-environmental conﬂicts that involve new and interesting political 
and theoretical challenges and also create strong tensions and ruptures 
within critical Latin American thinking. 
What Enrique Leﬀ (2006) referred to as the ‘process of environmen-
talisation of struggles’, is now, without doubt, a central aspect that is cre-
ating new turns, junctions, demands for articulation and shifts in the ﬁeld 
of Latin American intellectual thought. And this in turn within diﬀerent 
disciplines and knowledge systems such as sociology and critical philo-
sophy, political ecology, cultural studies, environmental studies, social 
economy, feminism, indigenous studies and new Latin American constitu-
tionalism among others.
It is certainly important that such knowledge systems and critical disci-
plines gain nourishment not only from historically cosmopolitan traditions 
– feeding oﬀ and invoking the most varied schools and currents of critical 
western modernity – but that they also build on other, formerly under-
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valued or epistemologically negated traditions, especially those related to 
local knowledge systems and the indigenous world view.
/is recent ‘ecology of knowledge systems’ as Boaventura de Sousa 
Santos (2007) has coined it, also includes the recovery of certain older 
themes and debates that extended across the history of social sciences and 
humanities in Latin America. As is well-known, these themes and debates 
have typically been characterised by a lack of articulation, which is a factor 
that worked against their recognition within the continent and internation-
ally. In this sense the extractive economic model and the current socio-
environmental struggles have helped resurface a set of nodal debates that 
cross critical Latin American thinking on concepts of progress, views on 
nature, the role of indigenous peoples in the construction of national and 
continental identities, as well as matters surrounding the persistence of 
national popular identities, debates that seem as belligerent and radical as 
perhaps never before.
/ese debates and shifts in positions have brought about a fracture 
within the ﬁeld of critical thinking. Eﬀectively, and in contrast to the 1990s, 
when the continent appeared re-formatted by the single neoliberal model, 
the new century is marked less by a unique discourse than by an ensemble 
of tensions and contradictions that are hard to integrate. /e transition 
into the Commodities Consensus poses new problems and paradoxes with 
a tendency to reconﬁgure the horizon of critical thinking, confronting us 
with theoretical and political ruptures crystallising in a set of ideological 
positions that are, it appears, increasingly antagonistic. 
Schematically and in general we could say that there are currently 
three discourses or positions on development. Firstly there is liberal neo-
developmentalism, then progressive neo-developmentalism and lastly the 
post-developmental perspective. We will discuss these three positions in the 
following based on some national cases. 
3. Liberal neo-developmentalism
Even though the Washington Consensus is being questioned, the 
liberal or neoliberal discourse is far from defeated. In essence, the basic 
orientations of this position have not changed, but faced with the Commo-
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dities Consensus they have been updated to a certain degree. Two decades 
after it was ousted, we are therefore witnessing the strong return of devel-
opmentalism as the overarching homogenising discourse that resurfaces as 
a word and a concept full of promises related to growth, productivity and 
modernisation. However, this time it surfaces in relation to the develop-
ment of ‘mega’ extractive projects and not to an ideology of industrialisa-
tion. In addition, the neoliberal discourse continues to equally emphasise 
the idea of a state subordinate to the market and above all to the now supra-
national regulatory institutions (that is, a meta regulatory state). Finally, 
nature, in spite of the new ecological framework established by the environ-
mental criticisms of the last two decades, continues to be seen as a ‘resource’ 
or as inexhaustible ‘capital’.
However, a new element of the Commodities Consensus is the combi-
nation of elements of neoliberal discourse and issues from the global 
agenda that seek to neutralise the potential for criticism of certain ideas or 
concepts. By this we mean for example the concept of sustainable develop-
ment that appears in this discourse but associated with a ‘diluted’ idea of 
sustainability (Gudynas 2011) that implies shifting the limits proposed by 
environmentalists. /is ‘diluted’ vision promotes an eco-eﬃcient position 
towards sustainability that conﬁrms the idea of nature as capital (linked 
now to over-exploitation and the expansion of areas where such exploitation 
takes place) whilst looking for ‘clean’ solutions – supposedly through new 
technologies – to any ‘problems’ (Martinez Alier 2005).
Secondly, another axis of the neoliberal discourse is the concept of 
corporate social responsibility. /e concept was promoted by the large 
transnational corporations and achieved institutional status under the 
Global Compact in 2000. It is based on the recognition of two factors: 
ﬁrstly that corporations are the primary subjects of the globalised econo-
mies and secondly that they themselves must deal with the conﬂicts with 
local populations relating to the social, economic and ecological impacts 
and risks created by their economic activities. Corporate social responsibil-
ity is connected to the concept of governance as a micro-political conﬂict 
resolution device with multiple actors in the mark of a consciously complex 
society (Svampa 2008, 2011a). Not only does this framework promote the 
belief of a symmetrical relation between those involved, but it also presents 
the diﬀerent levels of the state as another participant. Added to this are 
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other players – specialists, journalists and symbolic mediators among others 
– that contribute to a thickening in the process of ‘social discursive produc-
tion’ (Antonelli 2009) aimed at gaining ‘social permission’ by convincing 
and disrupting communities. In short, the combination of the three axes 
– sustainable development, corporate social responsibility and governance 
– conﬁgures the shared framework of the dominant discourse which aims 
to legitimise the extractive economic projects. At the same time it devel-
ops their local acceptance through a powerful mechanism of bio-political 
control of the population.
Of course, from a political point of view, the neoliberal vision can be 
very brutal and direct, as happens in countries with a strongly militarised 
or war-faring neoliberalism (Seoane et al. 2006) such as Peru, Colombia 
and increasingly also, Mexico. In Peru’s case this position was illustrated 
by former President Alan García, who in October 2007 published an 
article in the conservative newspaper El Comercio of Lima with the title 
$e syndrome of the gardener’s dog (El síndrome del perro del hortelano) that 
crudely and brutally anticipated his policies for the Amazonas region and 
the resources to be found there. “/ere are millions of idle hectares for 
forestry, further millions of hectares not farmed by the communities and 
that will never be farmed, furthermore hundreds of mineral deposits that 
cannot be exploited and millions of hectares of ocean that will never be 
used for mariculture and production. /e rivers ﬂowing down both sides 
of the Andean mountains are worth a fortune but are draining into the sea 
without producing electric energy” (García 2007: n.pag, translation TJ). 
/e idea of the gardener’s dog began to materialise in December 2007 when 
Congress granted Alan García legislative powers to establish norms with 
powers equal to laws that would ‘facilitate’ the implementation of the free 
trade agreement with the United States. In June 2008, the executive passed 
around 100 legislative decrees, among them the 11 laws that aﬀected the 
Peruvian Amazon region. /ese legislative decrees, baptised ‘the law of the 
jungle’ by indigenous groups and environmental NGOs, were criticised as 
unconstitutional from various sides.
Finally, the repression in Bagua in June 2009 cost the lives of over 30 
people from the Amazonas region, as well as 10 police oﬃcers and resulted 
in the disappearance of an unknown number of people. /is, combined 
with the protests that ensued, forced García’s government not only to repeal 
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the decrees that directly aﬀected the people’s right to be consulted, but also 
enabled the discovery of the peoples of the Amazonas region who histor-
ically had been excluded. /e Peruvian Amazon is home to 11 of the 
Peruvian population and 66 diﬀerent peoples, 14 of which have no contact 
with western culture. Most recently, in 2011, and in spite of the expecta-
tions generated by the election of Ollanta Humala as President of Peru, the 
government has again turned to militarist solutions to the conﬂicts in the 
Cajamarca region where people are resisting a mega mining project. /is 
conﬁrms the tendency to return to the classical approach of ‘order and 
investments’ associated with this neoliberal project. 
4. The blind spots of progressive neo-developmentalism
Neo-developmental progressivism and neo-developmental liber-
alism overlap and share a common framework in certain areas but there 
are also important diﬀerences, especially with regard to the role of the 
state and spheres of democratisation. One must stress that, concerning 
the diﬀerences, the rise of progressive and left-wing governments is intrin-
sically linked to the cycle of anti-neoliberal struggles in recent decades. 
/e protagonists of these struggles were diﬀerent social movements and 
peasant-indigenous organisations. /e era that began at the very beginning 
of the 21st century oﬀers a new framework for deciphering the relationship 
between society, politics and the economy, a new public agenda and politics 
related to the expansion of rights and the need to reduce poverty.
In countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador concepts such as decolonisa-
tion, the plurinational state, autonomy, the ‘good life’ (el buen vivir) and the 
‘rights of nature’ marked the new constitutional agenda within the frame-
work of strong participatory processes. At the same time they set the foun-
dations for the ecological and territorial turn of today’s social and environ-
mental struggles (Svampa 2011b). Still, over the last 10 years and with the 
consolidation of these regimes, other concerns have become more central. 
Even though the platforms for political action of many progressive or 
centre-left governments appear to be marked equally by an epic discourse 
as well as by actions leading to tensions and antagonisms (frequently in a 
nationalistic and popular tone) and that stress and exaggerate the diver-
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sion from the neoliberal model, these governments nonetheless promote an 
optimistic concept of nature and nature’s ‘comparative beneﬁts’, a concept 
today nurtured by the high prices of commodities.
Without doubt this vision is connected to what the Bolivian sociolo-
gist René Zavaletta called the ‘myth of proﬁt’ nearly 25 years ago. Zaval-
etta (2009 [1986]: 29-46) argued that this myth was based on the idea that 
the subcontinent is “the locus par excellence of natural resources”. By this, 
the Bolivian author made reference to the myth of El Dorado, “that every 
Latin American bears in his soul” with the idea of a sudden discovery (of 
a resource or natural good) which without doubt creates a proﬁt, but a 
proﬁt which is “magical” and “which in most cases has not been used in 
a balanced fashion.” /is is as much as should be mentioned about Zaval-
etta because after all it is clear that the author’s magical proﬁts are of little 
relevance to today’s environmental concerns. What is of signiﬁcance here is 
that the author’s obsession referred to the control of this proﬁt (its conver-
sion into “material for the state”).
Nevertheless, to think about the current return of this original, founding 
and long-standing myth of magical proﬁt in the guise of a new develop-
mental illusion related to the abundance of natural resources, it seems 
legitimate to return to Zavaletta. /e theme of abundance has been devel-
oped by several Latin American authors, among them Fernando Coronil 
(2002) who wrote about $e magical state (El estado mágico) in Venezuela, 
linking it to the proﬁt mentality and the ‘culture of the miracle’. In the 
same vein, Alberto Acosta and Jürgen Schuldt (referring to what is known 
as the ‘Dutch disease’) also reﬂected on the ‘curse of abundance’: /ere are 
countries which “are poor because they are rich in natural resources” these 
two authors conﬁrmed (Schuldt/Acosta 2009: 11, translation TJ; Acosta 
2009), and then went on to analyse the connection between the paradigm 
of the extractive economy and the population’s increasing poverty, rising 
inequality, the distortion of the productive structure and the depredation 
of natural resources.
Consequently, in the framework of a new cycle of accumulation, 
progressive governments seem to have regained resurrected this founding 
and rudimentary myth, which in today’s context nurtures the developmental 
illusion, expressed in the idea that, thanks to current economic opportuni-
ties (the rise of prices for raw materials and increasing demand, especially 
from Asia), catching up with industrialised countries can be achieved fast, 
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as can the promised but never realised development of these societies. In a 
shorter term the developmental illusion is related to the experience of crisis, 
that is, the neoliberal legacy of the 1990s associated with the rise of inequa-
lities and poverty and the possibility to now escape the consequences of the 
international crisis thanks to comparative advantages. /e ﬁscal surplus 
and the high annual growth rates of Latin American countries are to a large 
extent based on the export of primary products and form the foundations 
for a triumphalist discourse of a ‘speciﬁcally Latin American pathway’ that 
alludes to political, social and economic ruptures. For example, the end of 
the ‘long neoliberal night’ (as the Ecuadorian President Raphael Correa 
put it) has its political and economic correlate, which is linked to the great 
crisis at the turn of the 21st century (unemployment, fewer opportunities, 
migration). /is theme has also been commonplace in the discourse of the 
Kirchners in Argentina, who look to oppose today’s economic and social 
indicators with the ﬁgures of the neoliberal years (the 1990s neoliberal cycle 
under Carlos Menem) and of course with the ﬁgures during the great crisis 
in Argentina from 2001 to 2002, when the system that pegged the Peso to 
the Dollar broke.
In this sense the case of Bolivia is one of the most emblematic and at 
the same time most paradoxical Latin American scenarios for the develop-
mental illusion. In fact, the extraordinary rise in prices of commodities, to 
the extent that the nationalisation of companies translated into a multipli-
cation of the income linked to the export of raw materials, created enor-
mous expectations. At the beginning of the President’s second term there 
was an opening of the economy up to new exploitive projects. After a phase 
of struggle for hegemony (which ended with the defeat of the so-called 
half-moon oligarchy in 2008), a new phase, characterised by the consolida-
tion of a new hegemonic project (2010), began. Consequently, the Bolivian 
government has now intensiﬁed its pro-industrialisation discourse (the 
‘great industrial leap’ as Vice-President Alvaro García Lineras n/y called it), 
which focusses on a series of strategic megaprojects that are in reality based 
on the expansion of extractive industries: participation in the ﬁrst steps of 
Lithium exploitation, expansion of mega open-pit mining operations of 
large multinational corporations, construction of roads and large hydro-
electric dams in the context of IIRSA, and other projects. 
In more general terms this developmental illusion so deeply rooted in 
the Latin American political imaginary, appears related to the actions of 
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the state (as the producer and as far as globalisation allows, as a regulator) 
and to a whole set of social policies geared towards the most vulnerable 
sectors of society and ﬁnanced through the proﬁts from extractive projects. 
It is undoubtedly true that in a context where neoliberalism is no longer 
seen as natural, but called into question, and this questioning is nurtured 
by the emerging new progressive governments, the nation state has recov-
ered institutional tools and options by becoming an economically relevant 
player and, in certain cases, an agent of redistribution. Nonetheless, in the 
framework of critical state theories the tendency is clearly against the state 
becoming a ‘mega player’ again. As mentioned previously, the return to the 
regulatory state takes place within a sphere of variable geometries, that is, 
in a setting of multiple stakeholders (increasing complexity of civil society 
illustrated by social movements, NGOs and other stakeholders), yet closely 
linked to private multinational capitals, the importance of which for each 
of the national economies is becoming ever greater.
On the other hand, one must not forget that the state’s regained distri-
butive functions are rooted in a new social fabric (a worker and peasant 
matrix with strong plebeian elements), itself a product of the transforma-
tions of the neoliberal years and frequently – openly or secretly – of a conti-
nuity with those compensatory social policies applied in the 1990s through 
the models of the World Bank. Lastly, and beyond the oﬃcial industrialist 
rhetoric of the governments, the ongoing economic changes have aimed, 
in contrast to other times, at delving into the extractive model. /ere were 
undoubtedly several simultaneous variations of developmentalism as an 
‘ideology’ and an ‘economic model’ between the 1950s and the end of the 
1980s (the populist and the nationalistic-developmental model). However, 
at that time it alluded to the strengthening of an industrial-productivist 
approach and the intervention of the state as the primary player or ‘mega 
player’ (see Brieva et al. 2002).
In intellectual terms it is necessary to remember that, maybe more than 
in other regions, the left in Latin America – whether in its anti-capitalist or 
its national-populist guise – has strongly resisted ecological currents arising 
out of the criticism of the productivist paradigm. Indeed, not only did such 
criticisms question some of the pillars of Marxist theory, a clear heir of 
modernity, but the ecological problem was also seen by a large part of the 
Latin American left (with a few notable exceptions) as a concern imported 
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from the agendas of rich countries that helped reaﬃrm the inequalities 
between industrialised countries and those on the road to (or aspiring to) 
industrial development.
From this perspective Latin American progressivism, rooted in the 
developmental tradition, today shares a common platform with neoliberal 
discourse concerning the advantages of the Commodities Consensus, 
which, for the most extreme cases, resumes and promotes the productive 
‘Development/Corporate Social Responsibility/Governance’ triad as the 
dynamic axis of neo-developmental discourse. Furthermore, both posi-
tions underline the link between extractive mega projects and employment, 
thereby creating hopes for employment among the population that are 
hardly ever fulﬁlled because in reality these projects are typically capital- 
and not labour-intensive, as large-scale open pit mining projects emble-
matically show. “Large-scale mining projects are among the most capital-
intensive economic activities. For every million dollars invested only 0.5 to 
2 direct jobs are created. /e more capital-intensive an activity is, the fewer 
employment opportunities it will create and the lower the share of the total 
added value created by workers through their work they receive in the form 
of salaries: the largest proﬁt goes to capital. /e metal mining industry 
directly employs 2.75 million people globally, which is 0.09 of the total 
number of jobs globally. Small-scale mining employs about 13 million 
people. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), one 
third of miners in the 25 most important mining countries lost their jobs 
between 1995 and 2000. /is is mainly due to technology replacing people” 
(Colectivo Voces de Alerta 2011: 27; translation TJ). Moreover, both posi-
tions share the idea of the inexorable ‘destiny’ of Latin America as ‘nature-
exporting societies’ (Coronil 2002) within the framework of the new inter-
national division of labour and in the name of comparative advantages.
Lastly, both progressive and neoliberal language also share the orien-
tation towards an economy that adapts to the diﬀerent cycles of accumu-
lation. /is conﬁrmation of an ‘adaptive economy’ is one of the unre-
solved continuities at the core of both the Washington Consensus and the 
Commodities Consensus, in spite of the emphatic discursive rhetoric of 
progressive governments that demand economic autonomy and postulate 
the establishment of a political Latin American sphere. As mentioned previ-
ously, the Commodities Consensus develops a more ﬂexible ﬁeld of action 
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than the Washington Consensus but still establishes clear restrictions on 
the actions of the state (which already is no longer seen as a major player) 
and an inexorable restriction on the calls for democratisation of communi-
ties and villages aﬀected by the large extractive projects.
5. Post-developmentalism and criticisms of extractivsm
A third discourse and position opposes the Commodities Consensus, 
both in its neo-developmental as well as in its neoliberal guise.
We must not forget that in recent decades the crisis of the idea of 
development, in its hegemonic form, led to the revision of the paradigm of 
modernisation. Particularly important in this sense is the ecological position 
that began to become part of the global agenda after the Meadows report 
/e Limits to Growth (1972) was published. As a consequence of this, the 
ecological position helped question the ruling model for developmentalism 
whilst sending the countries of the global south clear signals that the model 
of industrial development followed by the countries of the global north was 
far from being a universal blueprint (Mealla 2006). Furthermore, since 
the 1980s, many Latin American authors who criticise the macro-social, 
planning and centralist vision of development highlighted the impor-
tance of an inclusive and participatory concept of development, deﬁned 
at a more local level by the respect for peasants and indigenous cultures, 
as well as by the strengthening of local and regional economies (Unceta 
Satrustegui 2009).
/e notion of ‘sustainable development’, which would go on to install 
itself in the political-ideological debate, was born at that time too. Besides 
its complexity, it is important to point out that there are two very diﬀe-
rent sides to the deﬁnition and limits of this concept. On the one hand 
there is a strong position that sees growth as a means and not an end in 
itself and is basically centred on the idea of responsibility (to today’s and 
future generations), and aims to respect the integrity of the natural systems 
that make life on the planet possible (political ecology, economic ecology, 
deep ecology and other paradigms). On the other hand there is the diluted 
position that believes in sustainable development based on technological 
progress and the eﬃcient use of such. Whilst the strong position is currently 
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upheld by diﬀerent social organisations, ecologists and critical intellectuals, 
the diluted position is part of the rhetoric of corporations and is used by 
government oﬃcials from a range of diﬀerent countries.
Lastly, towards the 1990s, the Colombian author Arturo Escobar 
(2005) coined the notion of ‘post-development’, which aims to dismantle 
the modern category of development as a discourse of those in power, the 
goal being to reveal the principal mechanisms of domination (the divi-
sion between development/underdevelopment; the professionalisation of 
the problem – i.e. by means of ‘experts’ – and its institutionalisation in a 
network of regional, national and international organisations), as well as 
the concealing of other local experiences and local knowledge and practices 
(the idea of epistemicide as Boaventura de Sousa Santos 2007 would later 
call it). 
Before continuing, it is worth adding that during the 1990s, under the 
Washington Consensus, the category of development as an overarching 
narrative associated with the state as a mega player disappeared. Now, 
under the Commodities Consensus we are witnessing its strong return, 
as much on the political as on the academic agenda, although, as we have 
seen, this cannot easily be compared to that which existed in other times.2 
In fact, this return shows that this is a very dynamic and changing cate-
gory that reappears after successive shifts (diluted versions of sustainable 
development in combination with other concepts like ecological moder-
nisation, corporate social responsibility and governance). /is resilience is 
highly problematic for transformation proposals which need to think the 
complexities to transform production and consumption.
Within the context of a resurgence of the concept of development as an 
overarching narrative and in line with indigenous currents, critical thought 
is re-considering the notion of ‘post-development’ and further elements 
of the strong sustainability position. /e post-development perspective 
formulates a radical critique of the hegemonic version of development as 
it was reformulated by neoliberalism and progressivism. It also criticises 
their vision of nature and promotes, as Gudynas (2011) states, a diﬀerent 
valuation of nature based on alternative registers and world views (such as 
indigenous world views, ecological perspectives, eco-communitarian views, 
eco-feminist positions, anti-colonial positions and the approaches by eco-
territorial movements). As a matter of fact, such positions demand a diﬀe-
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rent type of ecological rationality as a utopian vantage point from which to 
rethink the relationship between peoples/societies and nature in the context 
of the crisis of civilisation.
Still, as we have already pointed out, one of the fundamental critical 
categories of this position is the notion of the extractive economy. /is is 
a privileged category for assessing the diﬀerent crises in their complexity 
and how they aﬀect each other because it broadly highlights the important 
problems faced by societies today. In a recent article, the Marxist econo-
mist Bob Jessop (2011) proposes the interaction of four processes to under-
stand the crisis. Firstly, he suggests the global ecological crisis (oil, food and 
water); secondly, the decline of the United States, the return to a multi-
polar world and the rise of China; thirdly, the crisis of the global economy 
in the shadow of neoliberalism and the contradictions and struggles inhe-
rent to capitalism; and lastly, the crisis of a system of accumulation led by 
ﬁnancial capitalism and its contagious eﬀects.
Extractivism is a privileged position from which to read the multiple 
crises, because it warns us about the global ecological crisis and the increas-
ing risks of this form of appropriation of nature and the modalities of 
consumption. Secondly, it warns us about the decline of the United States 
and the incorporation of new global players, visible in the emergence of 
new extractive powers such as China and India and also in the consolida-
tion of kinds of regional sub-imperialist states such as Brazil. It also warns 
us about the global economic crisis, to the extent that the current extrac-
tive economic model arose from the neoliberal reforms in the 1990s, the 
normative and legislative framework of which remains in place; and lastly, 
it is associated with ﬁnancial capitalism in as far as this deﬁnes the prices 
of commodities.
Furthermore, and as we have already pointed out, the extractive 
economic model reminds us that a new cycle of abuse of ecological and col-
lective human rights is beginning, even though these rights are protected 
by national and international norms that also include the rights of indig-
enous peoples (ILO Convention 169). It is no coincidence then that one 
of the contested issues is the application of the ILO’s Convention 169 that 
demands the right for indigenous peoples to free, prior and informed 
consent. /is norm has become an important tool to control/regain terri-
tories threatened by the current model of development. Such develop-
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ment is visible not only in the Andean countries such as Peru, Ecuador 
and Bolivia, but also in Argentina. In fact, such abuse aﬀects so-called 
ﬁrst generation rights such as freedom of speech and the right to petition. 
/is has led to a dangerous spiral of the criminalisation of and litigation 
against social demands. From this perspective, the outlook for democracy 
in Latin America is beginning to look very bleak (and worrying). Finally, 
the extractive economic model highlights the crisis of modernity, or, as 
Arturo Escobar (2005) and Edgardo Lander (see this issue) put it, it shows 
the need to think of alternatives to modernity, or, more speciﬁcally, to 
think from the perspective of colonial diﬀerence.
In this sense the extraction-based economy is a very potent category. It 
has a strong mobilising character and can easily be used to denounce situ-
ations whilst also possessing descriptive and explicatory potential. To the 
extent that it deﬁnes a certain type of developmental policy and points to 
the deepening of a logic working on diﬀerent levels, its particular feature 
is that it highlights a whole set of deﬁning dimensions of the current crisis. 
In this regard it is a heavily political concept, because it eloquently ‘tells’ us 
about the disputes at stake and, beyond the existing asymmetries, points to 
a set of shared responsibilities between the north and the south, the centres 
and the peripheries. Still, we believe that excessive use of this category to 
denounce certain situations conspires against its descriptive potential and 
explicatory scope. /e extraction-based economy is a useful critical cate-
gory but we risk turning it into a kind of demonising concept, applicable to 
any situation related to the exploitation of natural goods. /is would thus 
disqualify other potential agents of transformation (like unionised urban 
populations). Rigorous use should help us to deactivate current myths 
and commonplaces related to development as well as assist us in building 
bridges to other sectors of society.
Coming back to the aforementioned critique of development, the post-
developmental perspective reveals strong criticism of neo-developmental 
progressivist positions. /ese tend to block the nodal characteristic of the 
aspect of extraction in the current model of accumulation, simplifying the 
ﬁelds of resistance. In reality, neo-developmental progressivism tends to 
minimise the scope of the idea of dispossession. /is idea forms the basis of 
criticisms of the current model of development of many social movements 
and intellectual currents. Only their ecological criticism is seen (therefore 
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they are disqualiﬁed as ‘environmental fundamentalists’), negating other – 
political, economic, social and civilisational – dimensions that this problem 
implies, as we described above.
/ere are still many countries where, without regard to the current 
discussions on the risks of the extraction-based economic model and 
an increasing dynamic of dispossession, the production-oriented vision 
remains dominant. In this sense, as has been pointed out on numerous 
occasions, it was the Andean countries that started this debate. Ecuador 
is without doubt the Latin American country where these issues are 
discussed most seriously. Within the context of a new ecological institu-
tional setting, the theme of a good life for all is postulated as an alterna-
tive to conventional development. By way of example, it should not be 
forgotten that the new constitution (2008) proclaims the rights of nature, 
describing nature as a subject with a right to be restored and defended. In 
the same vein, through the National Secretary of Planning and Develop-
ment SENPLADES (Secretaría Nacional de Planiﬁcación y Desarrollo), 
the government prepared the Plan for Good Living 2009–2013 (Plan del 
Buen Vivir, 2009–2013) that proposes, in addition to a ‘return of the state’, 
a change in the regime of accumulation from that of an exporter of primary 
products towards a more local development, centred on life and based on 
the use of biodiversity, knowledge and tourism. However, the government 
of Rafael Correa has taken a clearly neo-developmental path, for example 
with regard to mega mining projects that meet with considerable resis-
tance in the country. Another noteworthy element is the current crimina-
lisation of social and environmental struggles as ‘sabotage and terrorism’. 
Around 170 people are aﬀected by this, most of them in connection with 
social and environmental struggles. Correa’s declarations on the ‘childish 
environmentalism’ of organisations have not helped establish a dialogue in 
an atmosphere of open conﬂict between grassroots organisations and the 
government. /is division is reproduced within critical thinking, and the 
unity that existed during the constituent process of Montecristi (2008) has 
been lost. We should not forget that when Rafael Correa took oﬃce, his 
cabinet had a developmental and an ecological wing. One of the represen-
tatives of the ecological wing was the economist Alberto Acosta, who was 
president of the Constituent Assembly in Montecristi but who is currently 
one of the intellectuals most critical of the extractive economic regime.
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In Bolivia the situation is equally controversial. Obviously, due to the 
conﬂict between the government and regional oligarchs, internal diﬀe-
rences basically played no role during Evo Morales’ ﬁrst term. However, 
during the last two years, internal diﬀerences have surfaced with the 
re-consolidation of the national state. With this consolidation, several stra-
tegic laws were passed that limit the right to be consulted and the territo-
rial autonomy of indigenous territories. /is is aimed at facilitating extrac-
tive projects that include everything from lithium mining to mega open-pit 
metal mining projects. In this mood of tension, certain indigenous orga-
nisations such as CIDOB, the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of 
Eastern Bolivia (Coordinadora de Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano) and 
in some cases CONAMAQ, the National Council of Ayllus and Marcas 
of the Qollasuyo (Confederación Nacional de Ayllus y Marcas del Qolla-
suyo) have demanded their right to be consulted as established in the ILO 
convention 169 and have called for respect for their own political structures 
(as well as the installation of parallel indigenous authorities and the rejec-
tion of elections) as well as coherence between the discourse of the defence 
of Mother Earth and the practised extractive regime (Svampa 2011a, trans-
lation TJ). 
One of the turning points that put the extractive model on the agenda 
was the counter summit on climate change in Cochabamba in April 2010. 
At the famous table 18 it brought together (without government authorisa-
tion) those organisations that wanted to discuss environmental problems.
Another key moment was perhaps the year 2011. TIPNIS, the Indig-
enous Territory and National Park Isiboro Sécure (Territorio Indígena y 
Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure) turned into a conﬂict zone between its 
inhabitants and the government because of plans to build a road. TIPNIS 
is a very isolated and protected zone whose autonomy was recognised in 
the 1990s. /e conﬂict surrounding TIPNIS is of multiple dimensions. 
/e government defended the construction of the road, alleging it would 
help with the integration of the diﬀerent communities and would grant 
them access to healthcare and education and help them market their 
products. However, it was also true that the road would open the door 
to numerous extractive projects with negative social and environmental 
consequences (backed by Brazil and other partners) and that on the other 
hand the government was looking to curb the region’s autonomy without 
 Maristella Svampa
consulting the aﬀected indigenous population. In this sense, the blindness 
of the government after the Gasolinazo (December 2010) means we are 
faced with a process of construction of hegemony that is hardly pluralistic. 
Social organisations are not consulted and when they are, the government 
tries to patronise them. After a demonstration by indigenous inhabitants of 
TIPNIS to La Paz that was supported by several indigenous and environ-
mental organisations and after an obscure repression, the administration 
of Evo Morales backed away from its plans, even though the ﬁnal outcome 
of the conﬂict is still unclear. Nevertheless, what occurred in TIPNIS had 
the merit of restarting the discussion on the construction of hegemony in 
the more pluralistic framework of ‘leading by obeying’, which was one of 
the founding principles of Evo Morales’ government. Finally, at the end of 
2011, what happened in TIPNIS was to mark a before and an after because 
this conﬂict revealed the contradictions between an eco-communitarian 
discourse, protective of nature and in favour of protecting Mother Earth 
(Pachamama) and the reality of the extraction-based political practice 
of Evo Morales’ government. At the same time, it showed revealed the 
strong dispute over how one was going to deﬁne decolonisation in Bolivia, 
creating tensions between the strong position of the state and that of the 
attempted construction of a plurinational state. /e fact that various intel-
lectuals and important civil servants, who had been part of this project of 
change, left Evo Morales’ government, shows the fracture within critical 
thinking in Bolivia as well. In July 2012 several intellectuals who had been 
government civil servants published the Manifesto for the Renewal of the 
Process of Change (Maniﬁesto por la Reconducción del processo de cambio, 
see Coordinadora Plurinacional de la Reconducción 2011), albeit with a 
more nationalistic than environmental tone. Vice-president Alvaro García 
Linera (n/y) quickly answered this manifesto, calling his former colleagues 
resentful (among other epithets). In the end, the conﬂict surrounding 
TIPNIS helped to clarify criticisms of the model for development.
Argentina, with the governments under the Kirchners (Néstor Kirchner 
2003–2007, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 2007–2011, 2011 until today), 
is ﬁrmly on the traditional developmental track, with a discourse that, 
unlike Andean countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia, leaves little room 
for other ideas. Of course, there have been several conﬂicts that have put 
the environmental problem on the public agenda, sometimes directly, as 
Resource Extractivism and Alternatives
was the case in the conﬂict with Uruguay surrounding the building of a 
paper mill (leading to a long-standing blockade of the international bridge 
between the two countries by local activists from the Asamblea Ambi-
ental de Gualeguaychú movement between 2005 and 2010). Another such 
issue was the contamination of the Riachuelo basin and the discussion in 
Congress regarding a national law for the protection of the glaciers in 2010. 
Further conﬂicts, such as the one between agrarian corporations and the 
federal government on applicable variable export taxes in 2008, showed 
in more detail the process of dispossession of peasants and indigenous 
peoples in areas today called marginal, especially in the northern provinces 
and associated with the production of soy. /is latter conﬂict updated the 
binary schematic of Argentinean politics and helped align a set of intel-
lectuals with the central government, today connected in a group called 
Carta Abierta. 
In the context of a strongly polarised political climate tending to 
impoverish any debate, intellectuals and the new political youth linked 
to Kirchnerism tend to use an ‘armour-plated’ discourse when faced with 
complex problems such as the models to follow for mining, agro-business 
and the policy of concentration of agricultural land. /ey deny the central 
government’s adherence to the logic of dispossession which is characte-
ristic of certain state policies, underlining, in contrast, the results of social 
policies and the revitalisation of labour institutions such as collective bar-
gaining.
Currently, criticism of the extractive model is a primary issue for a set 
of territorial (not only social-environmental) and intellectual movements3 
linked to autonomy and the independent left. To a lesser degree it is also 
an issue for the classical left that centres its most important arguments on 
the dynamic of increasing precariousness inherent to the model of labour 
relations. 
In conclusion, with or without its popular-nationalist side, progres-
sivism continues to understand the problem in developmental terms 
linked to the ideas of economic growth, modernisation and the expansion 
of productive forces. In certain cases it does grant, although to a limited 
degree due to the pressure and mobilisation of social organisations, the 
opening of a political and theoretical debate on the diﬀerent dimensions 
and criticisms of development, as has happened in Ecuador and recently in 
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Bolivia, in light of what occurred with TIPNIS. However, progressivism’s 
practice and policies correspond to a conventional and hegemonic idea of 
development based on the idea of inﬁnite progress and supposedly inex-
haustible natural resources.
6. Theorising transition and its challenges
We mentioned that post-developmental positions unite a large number 
of currents with ambitions of decolonisation that aim, through a series of 
categories and concepts, to dismantle and deactivate arrangements of power, 
myths and imaginaries which form the basis of the current model of devel- 
opment. Simultaneously they aim to create new concepts for the future and 
recuperate others from the tradition of critical Latin American thinking, 
without renouncing either their mestizo consciousness or their indigenous 
past and present. /is in turn demands, as so many Latin American intel-
lectuals underline, the inclusion of critical thinking within a regional and 
global dimension of current processes (see Lander 2000, and others).
/ere are multiple perspectives that all share the idea of decoloni-
sation. For example, there is an integral environmental perspective that 
emphasises the idea of a good life; an indigenous, communitarian perspec-
tive; an eco-feminist perspective with a focus on the care economy and the 
struggle against patriarchy; and an eco-territorial position linked to the 
social movements that have developed a political grammar based on the 
ideas of environmental justice, common goods, territory, food sovereignty 
and the good life. Within this framework a discussion surrounding the 
rights of nature has recently begun and these rights have become part of 
the Ecuadorian constitution. Categories such as decolonisation, anti-patri-
archy, the plurinational state, interculturalism and the good life are general 
notions and concepts under construction which form the backbone of new 
Latin American thinking in the 21st century. Still however, and in spite of 
the advances and discussions, especially in Bolivia and Ecuador, mapping 
a wide space into which the diﬀerent transformative ideas are inscribed, a 
search for multidimensional strategies and concrete actions to further these 
general principles and ideas seems urgent.
In this vein, discussions have begun in many Latin American countries 
on alternatives to the extractive model and the need to work out ideas for a 
Resource Extractivism and Alternatives
transition from a matrix of multidimensional intervention scenarios. Due 
to the scale of the extractive model, a basic agreement would require exami-
ning responses on a larger scale. We believe that one of the most inter-
esting and thorough proposals has been developed by the Latin American 
Centre for Social Ecology (CLAES) directed by Eduardo Gudynas (2011) 
from Uruguay. According to this proposal, the transition will need a set of 
public policies that will make it possible to consider the link between social 
and environmental concerns in a diﬀerent light. It also considers that, faced 
with the extractive model, a set of ‘alternatives’ within the framework of 
conventional development would be insuﬃcient, and that therefore it is 
necessary to think of and draw up ‘alternatives to development’. Lastly, it 
stresses that this discussion must be analysed at a regional level and within 
a strategic horizon of change, or in what indigenous peoples term ‘the good 
living’.
Although these debates have resonated more strongly in Ecuador, it 
was in Peru that a group of organisations and members of RedGE, the 
Peruvian network for a balanced Globalisation (Red peruana por una Globa-
lización con Equidad), made a breakthrough. Shortly before the presi-
dential elections in 2011, they presented the main political parties with 
a declaration that had a strong impact. In this declaration they drew up 
a possible transition to a post-extractive economy through measures that 
aim at a sustainable use of land, the strengthening of tools for environ-
mental management, changes to the regulatory framework, the applica-
tion of the right to be consulted and other important issues. Maybe this 
idea lacks the radicality it has in other countries such as Bolivia or Ecuador 
because there is no talk of ‘the good life’ or the ‘plurinational state’, but it 
at least shows the need to think of less pessimistic scenarios, a discussion 
still lacking in countries like Argentina, which are nonetheless considered 
more ‘progressive’ (see RedGE 2011). As the economists Vicente Sotelo and 
Pedro Francke (2011) showed in their recent book, it is possible to envi-
sion a transition through public policy, that is, a scenario that combines 
economic and ecological reforms. /e book presents several possible scenar-
ios and shows that two measures in particular enable a viable transition 
to a post-extractive economy: ﬁrstly, a tax reform for greater revenue col-
lection (higher taxes for extractive projects or a super-tax for particularly 
high proﬁts) and a moratorium for mining, oil and gas projects that began 
between 2007 and 2011.
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On the other hand it is necessary to analyse successful experiences 
of development from below at a local and regional level, but not with the 
idea of mechanically reproducing them, or in terms of simply aggregating 
them; instead, one should analyse the diversity of these experiences and 
what makes them diﬀerent to others. In reality, the Latin American social, 
communitarian and solidarity-based economy oﬀers a whole range of possi-
bilities that must be explored in order to diversify the existing dominant 
capitalist economy. /is would undoubtedly require the appreciation of 
the value of other types of economies that in turn demands strategic plan-
ning directed at strengthening alternative, local economies (agro-ecology 
and social economy amongst others) scattered throughout the continent. It 
is not unusual for governments to aim to hide the possibilities and alterna-
tive modes of production in the region through public policies that aggra-
vate the ‘crisis’ and prepare the start of extractive projects to which scarce-
ly trustworthy studies of environmental impact that claim to minimise 
the eﬀects of this activity on the local economy are then added (Colectivo 
Voces de Alerta 2011). In addition, it not only requires the greater partici-
pation of ordinary people but also the greater intervention of the state (see 
Coraggio 2011).
Another large problem we face is the development of an idea of trans-
formation that conﬁgures a ‘horizon of desirability’ in terms of lifestyles 
and quality of life. /e resilience of the notion of development is largely 
due to the fact that the patterns of consumption related to the hegemonic 
model of development permeate the whole population. By this we refer to 
the cultural imaginary that builds on the conventional idea of development 
and on what is generally understood as ‘quality of life’. /e deﬁnition of 
‘a better life’ is usually associated with consumption, which for the poorer 
parts of the population and after so many crises, is becoming possible in 
the context of the commodities consensus.
On the other hand we must ask ourselves whether we should perhaps 
change the focus of the discussion. Before asking about the direction we 
wish to go in, we should perhaps develop a theory of human needs based 
on certain fundamental questions. For example, we should ask ourselves, 
what the minimum requirements are for a decent, and with regard to future 
generations, reasonably sustainable life. How can we satisfy these needs 
without hurting ourselves and without damaging our ecosystem? How can 
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we decolonise social needs that translate into new forms of slavery, auto-
aggression and aggression against the environment? How can we construct 
a decolonised sensitivity that then becomes a political power for change?
In this sense, and to conclude this article, we would like to mention 
three approaches that might help us re-consider a theory of requirements. 
A fundamental approach is the one developed by the economist Manfred 
Max-Neef. Traditionally, he says, it has been believed that human needs 
tend to be inﬁnite and that they constantly change, from one era to the next 
and from one culture to the next. However, this is not true. /e mistake lies 
in not diﬀerentiating clearly between the requirements and the means to 
satisfy those requirements. “Basic human needs are the same, in all cultures 
and throughout every historic period. What changes over time and from 
one culture to the next, is how or by which means these needs are met” 
(Max-Neef 1993: 50-1, translation TJ).
According to this author, every economic, social and political system 
adopts its speciﬁc forms to satisfy the same fundamental human needs. 
One of the deﬁning aspects of a culture is its selection of (always culturally 
constructed) means to meet those needs. Goods are the means by which 
the individual strengthens the elements required to meet his or her needs. 
When these goods become an end in themselves, life is at the service of 
these goods (instead of the other way around). /erefore, in light of the 
current crisis of civilisation, “the construction of a humanistic economy 
calls us to rethink the dialectic relation between needs and the means to 
satisfy those needs and goods” (ibid.).
Secondly, in Latin America and the global south there are numerous 
examples of social and solidarity-based economies whose social subjects of 
reference belong to the most excluded sectors (women, indigenous, young 
people, workers and peasants). We might note here an interesting contri-
bution by Franz Hinkelammert, who has developed criteria for the con-
struction of a reproductive rationality of life that neither substitutes nor 
eliminates the rationality between means and ends but subordinates them, 
thereby oﬀering elements for the creation of alternatives and the construc-
tion of what he calls ‘an economy for life’ (Hinkelammert/Mora 2005, 
translation TJ). From the perspective of the economy for life the purpose of 
human work is the production of use values or means for life. /e systems 
of the organisation and social division of work are only considered rational 
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if they allow for the reproduction of life over time. “/e most important 
aspect is the human being as a being with needs and the necessary repro-
duction of the material conditions for life” (ibid.). When examining the 
reproduction of external nature and of the human being, it is important 
to consider “the non-use values, which also condition existence and the 
possibility to reproduce the system of life. Our perspective must no longer 
centre on work value, instead we should focus on life value” (ibid.; see also 
the review of Hinkelammert’s book by Vargas Soler 2008).
Hinkelammert’s interpretation is very close to another perspective, the 
ethic of care advocated by eco-feminists. “By ‘caring work’ we refer to tasks 
related to human reproduction such as bringing up children, satisfying 
basic needs, promoting health, emotional support and facilitating partic-
ipation in society” (Pascual/Yayo Herrero 2010: 3; see also León 2009). 
/is is important, not only because of its criticism of essentialisms, but 
also because the new variants of eco-feminism can provide a view of the 
needs, not from the perspective of deﬁciencies or human suﬀering, but 
instead from one of retrieving a culture of care as a central inspiration for 
a social and ecologically sustainable society through values such as recipro-
city, cooperation and complementarity.
In conclusion, Latin American thinking in the 21st century needs to 
create a new epistemic system and re-consider existing contributions to 
develop a theory of human and social needs, not only as a basis for strong 
sustainability but also as a basis for strong interculturality that incorpo-
rates and recognises the traditionally subalternated subjects of our societies.
Translation by Tim Jack
1 /is article is based on the discussions during 2011 of the Permanent Working 
Group for Alternatives to Development (Grupo Permanente de Trabajo sobre 
Alternativas al Desarrollo 2011) supported by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. 
Within this framework an initial version of this text was presented for collective 
discussion in Quito and Brussels in June and July 2011 respectively. Furthermore, 
a later version was presented during the Latin American Seminar Derechos de la 
Naturaleza y Alternativas al extractivismo (Rights of Nature and Alternatives to 
the Extractive Economy) that we, as the Collective of Warning Voices (Colecti-
vo Voces de Alerta 2011) jointly organised with CLAES, Jóvenes por la Igualdad 
(Youth for Equality) and CEPPAS in Buenos Aires in November 2011.
Resource Extractivism and Alternatives
2 Certainly towards the 1990s, development as an overarching narrative temporari-
ly disappeared oﬀ the political and academic agenda, not only in Latin America 
but in other parts of the world too. /is abatement was related to the fact that, 
within the context of a crisis amongst the left and neoliberalism at its peak, Latin 
American social sciences – and in particular (political) economy and (political) 
sociology – which had led social thought for decades reached a signiﬁcant politi-
cal and epistemological turning point.
3 /is is also the basis for UAC, the Union of Citizen Councils (Unión de Aasam-
bleas Ciudadanas), consisting of diﬀerent grassroots organisations against mega 
mining projects and organisations that question the agro-business model, of the 
Frente Darío Santillán as well as human rights organisations like the Peace and 
Justice Service Serpaj (Servicio de Paz y Justicia) directed by Adolfo Pérez Esqui-
vel, and the Colectivo Voces de Alerta that several authors in this publication are 
members of.
References
Antonelli, Mirta A. (2009): Minería trasnacional y dispositivos de intervención en 
la cultura. La gestión del paradigma hegemónico de la “minería responsable 
y desarrollo sustentable”. In: Svampa, Maristella/Antonelli, Mirta A. (eds.): 
Minería Transnacional, narrativas del desarrollo y resistencias sociales. Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Biblos. 
Acosta, Alberto (2009): La maldición de la abundancia. Quito: Abya Yala.
Bárcena, Alicia (2011) Balance de una Década en América Latina: brechas por cerrar 
y caminos por abrir. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL. http://segib.org/actividades/
ﬁles/2010/12/Alicia-Barcena.pdf, 2.7.2012.
Brieva, Susana/Castellani, Ana/Fernandez Vila, M. Fernanda/Larìa, Patricia (2002): 
El concepto de desarrollo en las ciencias sociales. Pasado y presente de una cate-
goría central en el análisis de las sociedades latinoamericanas. Quito: FLACSO.
Colectivo Voces de Alerta (2011): 15 mitos y realidades sobre la minería transnacional 
en Argentina. Buenos Aires: Editorial El Colectivo-Ediciones Herramienta.
CEPAL (2010): Estudio Económico en América Latina y el Caribe 2009–2010. 
Impacto distributivo de las políticas públicas. Santiago de Chile: Naciones 
Unidas. www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/3/40253/
P40253.xml&xsl=/de/tpl/p9f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xslt,2.7.2012.
CEPAL (2011a): Balance preliminar de las economías de América Latina y el Caribe. 
Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas. http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/
xml/1/45581/2011-979-bpe-_book_web-cd.pdf, 2.8.2012.
CEPAL (2011b): Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe 2010–2011. 
Modalidades de inserción externa y desafíos de política macroeconómica en 
una economía mundial turbulenta. Santiago de Chile: Naciones Unidas. http://
www.eclac.cl/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/publicaciones/xml/1/43991/P43991.
xml&xsl=/de/tpl/p9f.xsl, 2.8.2012.
 Maristella Svampa
Coordinadora Plurinacional de la Reconducción (2011): Por la recuperación del 
proceso de cambio para el pueblo y con el pueblo . In: lahaine.org, 20.6.2011. 
http://www.lahaine.org/index.php?p=22900, 2.8.2011.
Coraggio, J. Luis (2011): Economía social y solidaria. El trabajo antes que e capital. 
Quito: Abya Yala.
Coronil, Fernando (2002): El Estado mágico. Naturaleza, dinero y modernidad en 
Venezuela. Consejo de Desarrollo Cientíﬁco y Humanístico de la Universidad 
Central de Venezuela. Caracas: Nueva Sociedad.
Escobar, Arturo (2005): El post-desarrollo como concepto y práctica social. In: 
Mato, Daniel (ed.): Políticas de Economía, ambiente y sociedad en tiempos de 
globalización. Caracas: Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Sociales, Univer-
sidad Central de Venezuela, 17-31.
García, Alan (2007): El síndrome del perro del hortelano. In: El Comercio, 
28.10.2007. http://elcomercio.pe/edicionimpresa/html/2007-10-28/el_
sindrome_del_perro_del_hort.html, 2.8.2012.
García Linera, Álvaro (n/y): El “oenegismo”, enfermedad infantil del derechismo. (O 
cómo la “reconducción” del Proceso de Cambio es la restauración neoliberal). 
La Paz: Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional. http://www.rebelion.org/
docs/133285.pdf, 20.7.2012.
Grupo Permanente de Trabajo sobre Alternativas al Desarrollo (eds., 2011): Más allá 
del desarrollo. Quito: Abya Yala/Fundación Rosa Luxemburg.
Gudynas, Eduardo (2009): Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo. 
Contextos y demandas bajo el progresismo sudamericano actual. In: Centro 
Andino de Acción Popular (CAAP)/Centro Latinoamericano de Ecología 
Social (CLAES) (ed.): Extractivismo, Política y Sociedad. Quito: CAAP/
CLAES, 187-225.
Gudynas, Eduardo (2011): Más allá del nuevo extractivismo: transiciones sosteni-
bles y alternativas al desarrollo. In: Wanderley, Fernanda (ed.): El desarrollo en 
cuestión. Reﬂexiones desde América Latina. La Paz: Oxfam/CIDES/UMSA, 
379-410.
Hinkelammert, Franz/Mora, Henry (2005): Hacia una economía para la vida. 
Preludio a una reconstrucción de la Economía. San José, Costa Rica: DEI.
Jessop, Bob (2011): /e State in the Current Crises: Crises of Capital, State Crisis, 
and the Crisis of Crisis Management. Paper presented during the seminar of 
the Rosa Luxemburg Fundation on “Societal Transformation and Political Stee-
ring in Latin America and Europe”, 17/18 June 2011, Brussels.
Lander, Edgardo (2000): Ciencias sociales: saberes coloniales y eurocéntricos. In: 
Lander, Edgardo (ed.): La colonialidad del saber: eurocentrismo y ciencias soci-
ales. Perspectivas Latinoamericanas. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 246-268. http://
bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/lander/lander1.rtf, 2.9.2012.
Leﬀ, Enrique (2006): La Ecología Política en América Latina. Un campo en const-
rucción. In: Alimonda, Héctor (ed.): Los tormentos de la materia. Aportes para 
una ecología política latinoamericana. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 21-39.
Resource Extractivism and Alternatives
Leon, Magdalena (2009): Cambiar la economía para cambiar la vida. Desaf ìos de 
una economía para la vida. In: Acosta, Alberto/Martínez, Esperanza (eds.): El 
buen vivir. Una vía para el desarrollo. Quito: Abya Yala. 
Martinez Alier, Juan (2005): El ecologismo de los pobres. Conﬂictos ambientales y 
lenguajes de valoración. Barcelona: Icaria Antrazo.
Mealla, Eloy (2006): El regreso del desarrollo. In: Scannone, Juan Carlos/García 
Delgado, Daniel (eds.): Etica, desarrollo y región : hacia un regionalismo inte-
gral. Buenos Aires: Ciccus.
Max-Neef, Manfred (1993): Desarrollo a Escala humana. Conceptos, reﬂexiones y 
algunas aplicaciones. Barcelona: ICARIA.
Pascual Rodriguez, Marta/Yayo Herrero, López (2010): Ecofeminismo, una propu-
esta para repensar el presente y construir el futuro. In: CIP-Ecosocial – Boletín 
ECOS 10, 1-9. 
RedGE – Red peruana por una Globalización con Equidad (2011): El Perú y el 
modelo extractivo: Agenda para un nuevo gobierno y necesarios escenarios de 
transición. http://www.redge.org.pe/node/637, 7.7.2012.
Sousa Santos, Boaventura (2007): Más allá de la gobernanza neoliberal: El Foro 
Social Mundial como legalidad y política cosmopolitas subalternas. In: Sousa 
Santos, Boaventura/Rodríguez Garavito, César A. (eds.): El derecho y la globa-
lización desde abajo. Hacia una legalidad cosmopolita. México: Anthropos, 
31-60.
Schuldt, Jürgen/Acosta, Alberto (2009): Petróleo, rentismo y subdesarrollo. ¿Una 
maldición sin solución? In: Centro Andino de Acción Popular (CAAP)/Centro 
Latinoamericano de Ecología Social (CLAES) (ed.): Extractivismo, Política y 
Sociedad. Quito: CAAP/CLAES, 9-40.
Seoane, José/Taddei, Emilio/Algranati, Clara (2006): Las nuevas conﬁguraci-
ones de los movimientos populares en América Latina. In: Boron, Atilio A./
Lechini, Gladys (eds.): Política y movimientos sociales en un mundo hegemó-
nico. Lecciones desde África, Asia y América Latina. Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 
227-250.
Sotelo, Vicente/Francke, Pedro (2011): ¿Es económicamente viable una economía 
post extractivista en el Perú? In: Alayza, Alejandra/Gudynas, Eduardo (ed.): 
Transiciones. Post extractivismo y alternativas al extractivismo en el Perú. 
Lima: Ediciones del CEPES, 115-142.
Svampa, Maristella (2008): La disputa por el desarrollo. In: Svampa, Maristella (ed.): 
Cambio de Época. Movimientos sociales y poder político. Buenos Aires: Siglo 
XXI/CLACSO.
Svampa, Maristella (2011a): Modelo de Desarrollo y cuestión ambiental en América 
Latina: categorías y escenarios en disputa. In: Wanderley, Fernanda (ed.): El 
desarrollo en cuestión. Reﬂexiones desde América Latina. La Paz: CIDES, 
OXFAM y Plura.
Svampa, Maristella (2011b): Extractivismo neodesarrollista y movimientos sociales: 
¿Un giro ecoterritorial hacia nuevas alternativas? In: Grupo Permanente de 
 Maristella Svampa
Trabajo sobre Alternativas al Desarrollo (eds.): Más allá del desarrollo. Quito: 
Abya Yala/Fundación Rosa Luxemburg, 185-218.
Unceta Satrustegui, Koldo (2009): Desarrollo, Subdesarrollo, maldesarrollo y post-
desarrollo. Una mirada Transdisciplinar sobre el debate y sus implicaciones. In: 
Carta Latinoamericana, Contribuciones en Desarrollo y Sociedad en América 
Latina No.7. Montevideo: CLAES, 1-34.
Vargas Soler, Juan Carlos (2008): “Hacia una economía para la vida” de Franz J. 
Hinkelammert y Henry Mora Jiménez. Reseña. In: Otra Economía 2 (2), 
172-176.
Zavaletta Mercado, René (2009): Lo nacional-popular en Bolivia. La Paz: Plural.
Abstracts
Latin America presents a very polarised scenario. Currently, one of the 
most remarkable patterns is the passage from the Washington Consensus, 
based on ﬁnancial valorization, to the Commodity Consensus, based on the 
large-scale extraction and exportation of natural goods. /e article attempts 
to characterise the current situation and, at the same time, aims at a pres-
entation of diﬀerent political and intellectual tendencies: liberal neo-devel-
opmentalism, progressive neo-developmentalism and post-developmental 
thinking. /e text analyses some links between these perspectives, espe-
cially between liberal neo-developmentalism and progressive neo-devel-
opmentalism, because both imply a return to the classical understanding 
of development in the strong sense, that is, associated with a productivist 
vision and incaccurate industrialist rhetoric. Finally and against his back-
ground, it presents some general lines of contemporary post-developmental 
thinking.
In Lateinamerika erleben wir ein kontrastreiches Szenario. Eines der 
bemerkenswertesten Muster ist der Übergang vom Washington Consensus, 
der auf ﬁnanzieller Inwertsetzung basierte, zum Commodity Consensus, bei 
dem es um die Extraktion und den Export von Naturgütern in großem 
Umfang geht. Der Artikel versucht, die aktuelle Situation zu charak-
terisieren und präsentiert unterschiedliche politische und intellektuelle 
Tendenzen: liberalen Neo-Developmentalismus, progressiven Neo-Devel-
opmentalismus und ein Denken in Kategorien des Post-Development. Es 
Resource Extractivism and Alternatives
werden einige Verbindungen zwischen den Tendenzen analysiert, insbe-
sondere zwischen liberalem und  progressivem Neo-Developmentalismus, 
die beide zum klassischen Entwicklungsbegriﬀ im starken Sinne zurück-
kehren, nämlich einer produktivistischen Vision und einer falschen indus-
trialistischen Rhetorik. Am Ende werden vor diesem Hintergrund einige 
allgemeine Denklinien des Post-Development präsentiert.
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